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Abstract
Analysis of the political economy of oil tends to be under the rubric of ‘resource curse’ to the
neglect of the broader problematique of the distribution of windfalls and wipeouts, the mediating
role of institutions, and broader issues of local economic development. This article tries to fill this
lacuna by focusing on the experiences of Sekondi-Takoradi, an oil city located in Ghana. Using the
principles of eminent domain and decentralisation as analytical framework, it shows ‘who gets
what’ in an oil city; demonstrates why different levels of compensation and betterment ought to
be paid and received; and reveals the role and struggles of the local State in trying to ensure
harmonious local economic development.
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Introduction
Until recently, Africa was not the focus of
attention among the world super powers –
particularly in terms of its oil prospects.
However, with the discovery of an esti-
mated 80bn barrels of oil in Africa, the
continent has become the focus of atten-
tion for many industrialised countries
(Servant, 2003). According to the African
Development Bank and African Union
(AU) (2009), the majority of the oil reserves
in Africa are in Libya, Angola, Nigeria,
Algeria, and New Sudan which collectively
hold 90% of the continent’s reserves.
Ghana joined the league of oil producers
in Africa only recently, but with much
pomp and pageantry: ‘Today is a special
day in the lives of Ghanaians; as we are
pouring the ﬁrst oil let’s give thanks to
God and enjoy . . .’, announced the late
President John Mills as he oﬃcially turned
on the requisite oil taps in the control room
in the Kwame Nkrumah vessel in Takoradi
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for oil production in commercial quantities
to begin (Boye, 2010) or, in the words of the
Ghanaian Times newspaper, for oil to ‘gush
out’ (Ekuful, 2010).
Ghana’s oil reserves are substantial.
Currently, the Jubilee Field, Ghana’s largest
oil ﬁeld, produces 105,000 barrels per day,
but it is expected to generate half a million
barrels of oil per day in the ‘foreseeable
future’ (Nuamah, 2013: 3). According to
the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning (2010), the total revenue from oil
in 2011 accounted for 1.9% of Ghana’s
GDP and the eﬀect of oil on the GDP
growth rate is anticipated to be substantial,
as shown in Table 1.
The problem
As with the rest of Africa (see, for example,
Lesourne and Ramsay, 2009; Obi, 2009,
2010) and the world at large (e.g. Cooley,
2001; Rosser, 2006), research on Ghana’s
oil industry is often framed in terms of the
resource curse doctrine (Corden and Neary,
1982). Researchers consider whether the
country will experience the problems asso-
ciated with the Dutch disease (e.g.
Breisinger et al., 2010; Centre for Policy
Analysis, 2010), volatility (Dagher et al.,
2010), and corruption (e.g. Gary, 2009;
King, 2009). With the issues framed in
those terms, the studies have tended to con-
sider how to manage resources in a trans-
parent manner (e.g. World Bank, 2009),
how adequate the existing policies are (e.g.
Gyampo, 2011), and the inﬂuence and
eﬀects of global forces (McCaskie, 2008).
These studies neither look at how wind-
falls and wipeouts are distributed within the
urban economy embedded in particular insti-
tutional make up nor at broader issues of
local economic development, particularly
the role of local institutions. Yet, under-
standing the dynamics of such windfalls
and wipeouts and the mediating roles of
institutions is crucial for policy making and
harmonious local economic development
(Alterman, 2012; UN-HABITAT, 2008).
This study
This study engages the principles of eminent
domain and decentralisation, as a relatively
new dimension to the political economy of
oil. It looks at property rights in Sekondi-
Takoradi, the twin oil city in Ghana. In
particular, it analyses the distribution
of the windfalls and wipeouts generated
in the built environment, considers the
resulting issues of compensation and better-
ment, and explores the mediating role of
the city authorities in ensuring harmonious
local economic development. The analysis
explores surplus and wipe out distribu-
tion dynamics, and processes and institu-
tional interactions that can aﬀect the
ways in which the resulting streams of
income will be used for local economic
development.
It attempts to ﬁll a major gap in the
literature on property rights in developing
countries (Alterman, 2011: 4, 2012), and
contributes an ‘emerging oil economy’ per-
spective to the literature on ‘oil cities’,
dominated by studies on already existing
oil economies, such as Port Harcourt in
Nigeria (see, for example, Obi, 2008,
2009, 2010).
Drawing on an eminent domain-decen-
tralisation framework and multiple sources
of evidence, including historical and con-
temporary published and unpublished
sources, the article reveals that there are
complex distributional issues about gains
Table 1. Projected GDP growth rates, with and
without oil, 2011–2013.
GDP 2011 2012 2013
Without oil 7.0 7.0 7.0
With oil 12.3 9.3 8.3
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2010).
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and costs – or, as they are sometimes
called, windfalls and wipeouts (Alterman,
2012) – that have currently been ignored
in policy circles. While Sekondi-Takoradi
Metropolitan Assembly (STMA), the local
government of the city, has tried to position
itself in order to exploit oil rents for the
public good, these eﬀorts have proven to
be necessary but not suﬃcient to trigger
and shepherd the process of harmonious
local economic development.
The rest of the study addresses three
issues. First, it looks at some of the charac-
teristics of the oil city. Next, it examines key
distributional issues in the city by engaging
the doctrine of eminent domain. Then, it
turns to institutional questions and pro-
cesses of local economic development
within the principles of decentralisation.
The city
Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana’s twin city is the
city closest to the oil site. It is located in the
Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly
(STMA) in the Western Region of Ghana
(see Figure 1).
Sekondi is the older of the twins. It had
very humble beginnings, mainly as a ﬁshing
settlement and known only because the
Dutch and the British built a few forts
there (Jeﬀries, 1975). Like Sekondi,
Takoradi emerged as a ﬁshing town, but
the city was buoyed by the development of
rail and sea transport in the 20th century,
making it one of the prominent centres of
economic activity in the Gold Coast and,
later, a cornerstone of the independence
struggles for the new Ghana Republic
(Obeng-Odoom, 2012a).
Not much was heard, done, or said about
Sekondi-Takoradi, post-independence
(1957–2006). Housing conditions deterio-
rated, as did the state of general infrastruc-
ture (Owusu and Afutu-Kotey, 2010).
Writers familiar with Sekondi in its hey-
day could only euphemistically say that it
had ‘seen better days’ (Re´my, 1997: 139).
In Takoradi, the magniﬁcent Railways
Building stood, but only as a pale shadow
of its buoyant days when its ancillary facil-
ities and services were not decrepit. As a
twin city, the city authorities declared the
economy of Sekondi-Takoradi as lagging
(STMA, 2012).
However, since 2007, the city appears to
have had a new lease of life. The ‘oil year’ –
the year 2007 – was a watershed in the evo-
lution of the city. The city bounced back
into the news again but, this time, as an
‘oil city’. A dedicated periodical, Oil City
Magazine, is regularly produced to broad-
cast the booming economic activities in the
city. The Takoradi Airport, hitherto only a
military base, now hosts two commercial
aircraft companies with ﬂights in and out
of Takoradi almost throughout the week.
Sometimes the aircraft can make multiple
trips,1 an indication of the brisk business
in Takoradi today.
This new phase of the city complements
Sekondi-Takoradi’s status as the third lar-
gest city in the country and the capital of
the natural resources-rich Western Region
of Ghana. The current population of
Sekondi-Takoradi is estimated at over
400,000 people (UN-HABITAT, 2011),
18% of whom are employed in agriculture.
Of this share, some 5000 people are
involved in ﬁshing and some 47,000 people
farm plots of land which average 5 acres
(STMA, 2011). While about 51% of the
land in the entire metropolis is suitable for
agriculture, STMA (2011) has recently
noted that only 34% of the cultivable land
in the metropolis is under farming. The city
has a huge service sector and, to quote
Remy (1997: 139), ‘a heavy accent on
industry’.
It is important to study in what ways oil
exploration and production are aﬀecting
property rights in the city, and understand
the eﬀorts and constraints of the existing
system of local government to provide the
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ingredients necessary to produce eﬀective
spatial development plans; identify the
areas requiring new infrastructure, new
housing, new welfare and education ser-
vices; and generate new tax revenues from
oil production for harmonious urban eco-
nomic development. The principles of emi-
nent domain and decentralisation provide
useful analytical frameworks for this exer-
cise, hitherto overlooked in the research on




The doctrine of eminent domain holds that
compulsory acquisition with fair compensa-
tion is necessary in the process of economic
development (see the Saltpeter case). The
Figure 1. The city and its environs. The Western Region STMA Takoradi.
Source: Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly (STMA) (2012).
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doctrine takes a middle-of-the road view of
the polarised debate between conservatives
(e.g. John Locke) who hold that there
should be total private property in land
and progressives (e.g. Jean-Jacques
Rousseau) who hold that private property
should not be created in land because land
is a free gift of nature (Alterman, 2012). The
doctrine posits that it is desirable for both
private and public property to co-exist, in so
far as the State has the right to acquire pri-
vate property for public beneﬁt subject to
appropriate compensation (Saginor and
McDonald, 2009).
The theoretical justiﬁcation for the pay-
ment of compensation is the notion of tak-
ings. A taking is either a compulsory
physical acquisition of land or a reduction
in the market value of land (Frieden, 2000).
It may be classiﬁed as direct (arising – dir-
ectly – from an act or a process) or indirect
(as in a ‘third party’ loss), total (complete
reduction of market value to zero) or partial
(relatively minor reduction in property
value). Alternatively, it can be private
(a diminution in value caused by private
estate developers) or public (value reduction
that results from state or public execution of
projects) (Alterman, 2011). Takings deprive
landowners of their property rights which
are often deemed to be secure because of
the protection they receive from the
public. For that reason, the State normally
awards compensation to landowners who
suﬀer a taking (Bromley, 1997).
The doctrine of eminent domain implies
that landowners who beneﬁt from an
increase in their land values out of public
investment or activities unrelated to their
own exertion are required to make a pay-
ment to the public. This ‘value capture’,
capture of ‘plus value’, or the payment of
‘betterment’ (Alterman, 2012) has long been
advocated by Henry George who identiﬁed
the problem of landowners beneﬁting from
their land whose value tends to appreciate
because of public expenditure (Alterman,
2012; George, 2006; Stilwell, 2006: 89–91;
Stilwell and Jordan, 2004).
However, the issues of property rights
entail not just a ‘one-oﬀ’ compensation and
the taxation of part of the ensuing short-term
betterment, but broader roles of institutions
in ongoing local development and the need for
local governments to have some mechanism
of local property taxation in order to ensure
that the local public services (e.g. roads, hos-
pitals, schools, water, and drainage) necessary
to cope with major economic developments
are adequately funded. Sub-national govern-
ments are particularly important in such
considerations because advocates of decen-
tralisation hold that local governments are
closer to the people; know their people’s
needs; and, being accountable to them, tend
to have the incentives to ensure the local
people live a satisfying life (Rondinelli, 1980;
Smoke, 2003; World Bank, 2003).
Within this analytical framework, the
next section addresses three sets of ques-
tions. The ﬁrst set relates to compensation,
namely (1) whether compensation is justi-
ﬁed/required; (2) whether existing laws pro-
tect property rights by providing for
compensation; and (3) whether the State,
in fact, would pay compensation. The next
cluster relates to betterment, to establish (4)
whether a case for the payment of better-
ment can be made; (5) whether betterment
payment is required by existing laws; and
(6) whether, in fact, betterment payment
would be made, and the last set to local
governance, especially (7) what are the func-
tions and powers of the local authority;
and (8) whether the local government
authority is able to use its functions and
powers to foster harmonious local economic
development.
Compensation
The few existing studies on the ramiﬁcations
of oil exploration and production on prop-
erty rights in Sekondi-Takoradi (Adu, 2009;
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Edem, 2011; Obeng-Odoom, 2009, 2013)
anticipate three types of takings. The ﬁrst
relates to loss of ﬁshing rights as a result
of oﬀshore oil drilling and production; the
second relates to loss in farmlands whose
value can diminish because of oil-related
environmental damage; and the third to
physical loss of land arising from onshore
oil and gas exploration.
The Petroleum Revenue Management
Act, 2011, Act 815, too expects such takings
(see Clause 25 of the memorandum). It
notes in Section 24(3) that: ‘Where petrol-
eum operations adversely aﬀect a commu-
nity, appropriate compensation shall be
paid for the beneﬁt of the community in
accordance with the relevant laws’.
Similarly, the Petroleum Exploration and
Production Law (PNDCL 84) of 1984 oﬀers
protection of private property rights. It
states that: ‘any person having a title to or
interest in such land who suﬀers any loss or
damage as a result of the petroleum oper-
ations shall be entitled to such compensation
as may be determined by law’ (Section 6, 2b).
Further, there are constitutional guarantees
of property rights (Article 18 of the
Constitution of Ghana) and protection
against both partial and physical takings.
Article 20 of the Constitution of Ghana
notes that ‘[n]o property of any descrip-
tion, or interest in or right over any prop-
erty shall be compulsorily taken possession
of or acquired by the State’ (Clause 1)
unless it is absolutely necessary (Clause
1a) and that necessity is made public and
backed by and done in accordance with
law (Clause 1b). Even when these condi-
tions are met, the expropriated persons
are entitled to fair and adequate compen-
sation which has to be paid promptly
(Clause 2a). And, in circumstances where
there is physical displacement, the State
shall settle the displaced people (Clause
3). Also, the aﬀected persons shall have a
right of access to the High Court to chal-
lenge the taking (Clause 2a).
While the laws relating to petroleum and
the constitutional provisions deal with
physical taking or compulsory acquisition,
there are other laws that protect takings in
the form of a reduction in market value.
The Local Government Act, Act 462
(Section 56), and the Town and Country
Planning Act, 1963 (Sections 21–26) stress
the legal protection and compensation
rights of landowners whose properties
suﬀer a reduction in market value as a
result of the implementation of a planning
scheme, any work related to its execution,
or any actions or inactions done by any per-
sons to make it possible for the scheme to
work.
Whether the State does, in fact, respect
these laws, however, is not so straightfor-
ward. A search via the Ghana Law Finder
(2009), the Legal Library Services, Gud 9t
containing most digitised Ghana Law
Reports, shows that cases involving com-
pensation arising from partial takings have
never been contested in the courts of law.
For this reason, it is diﬃcult to make a
determination on whether the State would
pay compensation to those whose property
rights have been taken in Sekondi-Takoradi
since 2007.
The realm of physical taking is rather
diﬀerent. There is plenty of evidence to
inform contemporary political economic
analysis. Historically, the Ghanaian State
has chronically defaulted on compensation
payment for physical takings. Between 1850
and 2004, the State executed 1336 instru-
ments to compulsorily acquire land. It did
so in all 10 regions of Ghana. The regions
with the greatest share of compulsorily
acquired lands were Greater Accra
(34.1%), followed by the Western Region
(26.7%) where Sekondi-Takoradi is located.
The State defaulted on the payment of most
of the required compensation (Larbi et al.,
2004: 121–122). In a few instances, the
State did pay compensation. However,
even then, it tended to make procedural
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errors in its payment mainly because of the
fear of oﬀending powerful interest groups
such as tribal chiefs (Brobbey, 1990).
Sometimes too, the method of assessing
compensation was problematic as it
generated conservative estimates (Larbi
et al., 2004).
Whether the historical evidence can
predict the behaviour of the Ghanaian
State in the present circumstances where
oil is ‘fuelling’ changes in property relations
is hard to say. However, there is some
evidence that the State is unlikely to
depart from its past behaviour. A section
of the Western regional chiefs recently peti-
tioned the Parliament of Ghana on issues of
compensation (Gyampo, 2011). According
to the chiefs, given that oil exploration
and production are taking place in their
region, the State had to oﬀer 10% of
the oil revenue accruing to it as compensa-
tion. However, the Parliament of Ghana
rejected the request because, it argued,
the oil revenue is for national, not regional,
development (Gadugah, 2010). The
basis of the rejection appears to be
Article 257, Clause 6 (emphasis added)
of the Constitution of Ghana, which
states that:
Every mineral in its natural state in, under
or upon any land in Ghana, rivers,
streams, water courses throughout
Ghana, the exclusive economic zone and
any area covered by the territorial sea or
continental shelf is the property of the
Republic of Ghana and shall be vested in
the President on behalf of, and in trust for
the people of Ghana.
The Parliament of Ghana further argued
that if it granted the request of the chiefs
from Sekondi-Takoradi and other parts of
the Western Region, it would be setting a
bad precedent for chiefs in other mining
towns to follow (Gyampo, 2011).
This singular incident foreclosed discus-
sions about how to assess the quantum of
compensation – a key question that requires
further consideration. In modern valuation
practice, the issue of compensation can be
based on market value or developers’ proﬁt
perspective, negotiation perspective, or a
perspective that combines the diﬀerent per-
spectives (Boydell and Ulai, 2011). It is not
clear how the chiefs arrived at the 10% for-
mula. They sought to do so by negotiation,
but without engaging the oil companies and
communities which are major stakeholders.
That procedure raises important political
economic issues, such as whether the chiefs
truly represent the people, whether they
have the competence to negotiate, and
whether public discourse has suﬃciently
focused on international private capital.
In the Ghanaian traditional system, it is
believed that the indigenous chiefs do, in
fact, represent the people on the basis that
there is considerable deference to the chief-
taincy institutions (Bob-Milliar, 2009;
Kleist, 2011). However, there is some evi-
dence that, with respect to the land ques-
tion, chiefs have recurrently abused trust
reposed in them (Austin, 2005; Ubink,
2007, 2008). Also, it is not clear whether
chiefs are suﬃciently skilled to negotiate
with the state and mining companies.
Evidence from countries where participa-
tory engagement is in place
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2008, 2009, 2010) shows
that indigenous people are often involved in
negotiations about compensation, but most
are not suﬃciently skilled in that art.
Another troubling feature of the compensa-
tion issue in Sekondi-Takoradi is that the
activities of the chiefs ignore the role of
transnational corporations. Although docu-
mented historical and oral evidence pre-
sented by Ofosu-Mensah (2011) and Bloch
and Owusu (2012) shows that international
private capital has consistently provided
local projects in mining towns and paid
some compensation to landowners and the
State, there is some evidence that such pack-
ages are neither ‘fair’ nor ‘adequate’ given
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that they tend to be one-oﬀ payments, while
the eﬀects of mining on local communities
are established to be continuing (Akabzaa
and Darimani, 2001).
These considerations show that, while
the residents of Sekondi-Takoradi, espe-
cially the ﬁsher groups, require some com-
pensation, neither the State nor private
capital is fully committed to its payment.
Betterment
Not everyone suﬀers a taking in Sekondi-
Takoradi; others enjoy substantial increases
in the value of their landed property. There
is strong evidence that property values are
rising in the city. Gadugah (2009) has
reported that there have been sharp
increases in rental values, ranging from
20–88% since the discovery of oil. Yalley
and Ofori-Darko (2012) oﬀer rates of
increase for parcels of land and housing
units as shown in Table 2.
My own, more recent interviews
(December 2012 to March 2013) at the
Lands Commission, Rent Control
Department, and the Ghana Revenue
Authority in Sekondi-Takoradi conﬁrm
that there have been sharp and substantial
increases in market value, although my
sources do not reach a consensus on the
precise rate of increase. Yet, the key point
is that there have been tremendous increases
in value. These increases beneﬁt the land-
owning class. As with the rest of Ghana,
land is predominantly customarily owned.
The allodial interest in land in STMA is
jointly vested in the three traditional autho-
rities of Sekondi, Ahanta, and Esikado.
These paramount chiefs manage the
land with some 37 divisional chiefs, about
30 sub-stools and about 64 families
(Farvacque-Vitkovic et al., 2008), not with
STMA or any other planning authority.
Individuals own the usufructuary interest.
However, several surveys (e.g. Edem, 2011;
Enin, 2011; Yalley and Ofori-Darko, 2012)
show that it is private landlords (or house
owners engaged in the letting of houses) and
customary landowners who have beneﬁted
the most from the substantial increases in
value through sales (sometimes to business
interests such as speculators), leasing, and
increases in rent.
According to Section 24(1) of the
Town and Country Planning Ordinance
(of Ghana), 1945:
Where the operation of any provision con-
tained in a scheme or by the execution of
any work under a scheme, any property
within the area of which the scheme
applies is increased in value, the
Minister, if he makes a claim for the pur-
pose within three years after the comple-
tion of the work, as the case may be, shall
be entitled to recover from any person
whose property is so increased in value
the amount of that increase.
It must be determined what the factors
that aﬀect land values are and ascertain
whether they are the result of public invest-
ment. My interviews at the Lands
Commission, Ghana Revenue Authority,
Rent Control Department, and a number
of estate agencies in the city suggest that
there are three causes. First, there has
been a surge in the number of immigrants
who have come from diﬀerent cities and
towns in Ghana, neighbouring countries,
and other countries around the world, and
in a situation where demand is outstripping
supply, rental values have tended to rise as a
result. Second the State has made public
Table 2. Increases in land and housing values,
2007–2011.
Types of housing Land Housing
First class areas 800% 200%
Second class areas 400% 200%
Newly developing areas 500% 200%
Source: Yalley and Ofori-Darko (2012).
436 Local Economy 28(4)
 at University of Technology Sydney on November 27, 2013lec.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
investments in the city (e.g. road construc-
tion and repairs) since the oil ﬁnd. Finally,
property values have been beaten up by
speculation, especially by investors who
are making purchases of land in the city to
take advantage of opportunities related to
oil. So, it is necessary to capture the wind-
falls through betterment.
However, analysis of the cases reported
in the Ghana Law Reports, using the Ghana
Law Finder (2009), the Legal Library
Services Gud 9t shows that in practice the
law on betterment has never been tested in
any major case in the Ghanaian courts. Yet,
landlords continue to wallow in the aﬄu-
ence bequeathed by the windfall, while
low-income people unable to catch up
with the hyper increases in rent, housing,
and land values have had to look for
poorer housing (Edem, 2011; Owusu and
Afutu-Kotey, 2010). So, while the oil
oozing through the economy of Sekondi-
Takoradi has given the city a new lease of
life, the distribution of income in the city
has become more unequal. It is necessary
to analyse how the institutions mandated
to ensure broad local economic develop-
ment in the city are grappling with the ten-
sions and contradictions accompanying
Sekondi-Takoradi’s nascent oil industry.
Local governance and local economic
development
STMA is one of 170 local governments in
Ghana. According to the Local Government
Act, Act 462, Section 10, STMA is respon-
sible for the ‘overall development of the dis-
trict . . . and [has to] formulate and execute
plans, programmes and strategies for the
eﬀective mobilization of the resources
necessary for the overall development of
the district’.
However, the ability to design plans, to
identify need, and to address need, is contin-
gent on the availability of personnel, logistics,
and political will, not only of STMA but
also the central Government of Ghana.
Since 2007, STMA has undertaken major
reforms in its activities. Three are particularly
noteworthy. First, it has contracted a pri-
vate valuer to prepare a digitised map
of land values in the assembly (Farvacque-
Vitkovic et al., 2008). Second, there has
been a metropolis-wide street-naming exer-
cise to enhance the process of planning.
Finally, the assembly has prepared a
draft Sub-Regional Spatial Plan, a draft
Structure Plan for Sekondi-Takoradi, and
the Western Regional Spatial Development
Framework. These plans collectively set the
vision, objectives, and the strategy of the city
authorities to attain harmonious urban
development.
While the assembly has successfully
reduced the high levels of rate delinquency
reported by Farvacque-Vitkovic et al.
(2008) in recent times, mainly because of
using improved tracking systems operated
by a private specialist ﬁrm, STMA remains
heavily dependent on central government
revenue for its activities, as shown
in Table 3.
Thus, the success of its policies is heavily
circumscribed by central government poli-
cies. STMA can obtain development loans














Source: RevNet Office, STMA,
Sekondi, 2012–2013, fieldwork.
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to ﬁnance its activities but, according to
Section 88 of Act 462, STMA can borrow
only up to ¢20m (about Gh¢2000 or about
$1000). If it wants to borrow any extra
amount, it has to consult the Minister for
Local Government and Rural Development
who, in turn, has to get the approval of the
Minister for Finance and Economic Planning.
To ﬁnance its plans, therefore, STMA is
heavily dependent on the central govern-
ment’s District Assemblies Common Fund
(DACF),2 which typically makes up over
50% of its total revenue. In theory, it can
reap more revenue from property rates
which tend to increase as property values
rise. However, in Sekondi-Takoradi, there
are both institutional and systemic reasons
that create a schism between the theory of
property taxation and its practice. The
Assembly is let down by a poor property
registration system. While it possesses a
Deeds Registry, land transactions take
place so informally in Sekondi-Takoradi
that their registration is the exception
rather than the norm. Also, contrasted
with land title registration, deed registration
does not provide suﬃcient protection
against competing claims to land, a
common problem in Sekondi-Takoradi.
Further, as suggested by Rebecca Sittie
(2006), the Chief Registrar of Lands, most
people perceive the registration fees to be
too expensive relative to their incomes,
while others do not understand the need
for registration. In turn, the property regis-
ter is a poor basis for planning a robust
property taxation system.
More fundamentally, the property rate
system in STMA, and Ghana generally, is
calculated in such a way that the local gov-
ernment is unable to tap a signiﬁcant share
of value increases in a systematic way. Thus,
the system in Ghana is unlike the system in
countries such as the UK where property
rates are calculated on the basis of open
market rental values and for which reason
an increase in property values can be
captured by the State through property
rates (Watt, 2004). In Ghana, replacement
cost is the basis of calculating property rates
(Act 462, Section 96). In turn, it is unlikely
that the increases in property values can be
captured through the property rate system,
as construction cost tends to lag behind
open market values.
A major transformation is needed to
reverse the status quo, but this is unlikely
to materialise given the global evidence of
great resistance to such attempts to capture
windfalls (see, for example, Stilwell and
Jordan, 2004). A direct ﬂow of income
from oil funds would enable the STMA to
ﬁnance its planning activities more eﬀect-
ively and hence ensure improved conditions
in the local economy. Such a scenario may
be realised in two ways, the ﬁrst of these
being an increase in STMA’s DACF, result-
ing from increases in the national revenue.
However, this channel is general, not
STMA speciﬁc. That is, it is likely to beneﬁt
all other districts that are not exposed to the
peculiar dynamics of Sekondi-Takoradi as
an oil city. Alternative channels are either
by permitting STMA to directly tax busi-
nesses that will spring up in the oil city or
by making STMA the direct recipient of tax
revenue transfers from the central govern-
ment. While under Articles 174 and 254 of
the Constitution of Ghana, the Parliament
of Ghana can legislate for local govern-
ments such as STMA to collect additional
taxes or levies outside of the usual metro-
politan sources of ﬁnance (such as market
tolls and property rates), currently, STMA
has no such options or powers. So, the ﬁrst
option is unlikely to happen.
Similarly, the second option of receiving
special funds is unlikely to materialise. The
oﬃcial position of the Government of
Ghana on how to generate, manage and dis-
tribute oil revenue is contained in the
Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011,
Act 815. According to the Act, all petrol-
eum rents shall be deposited in the
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Petroleum Holding Fund based at the Bank
of Ghana (Section 2). In addition to this
fund, there is a Ghana Stabilisation Fund,
the purpose of which is to ‘cushion the
impact on or sustain public expenditure
capacity during periods of unanticipated
petroleum revenue shortfalls’ (Section 9).
There is a third fund called the Ghana
Heritage Fund which is to ‘provide an
endowment to support the development
for future generations when the petroleum
reserves have been depleted; and receive
excess petroleum revenue’ (Section 10).
Currently, the oﬃcial government position
is that 70% of oil rents will be expended to
support the annual budget. This portion is
to be called the Annual Budget Funding
Amount. The remaining 30% is to be
regarded as 100%, which will then be split
into a Heritage Fund (30%)3 and
Stabilisation Fund (70%) (Kwettey, 2010).
So, there is no provision for any extra
support to STMA. Indeed, no member of
the Civil and Local Government Staﬀ
Association is a member of the Investment
Advisory Committee that is established to
counsel the Minister of Finance on how to
invest the revenues from oil (Section 30).
Members on this committee should be
people who have ‘proven competence in
ﬁnance, investment, economics, business
management or law or similar disciplines’
(Section 31), but not in planning. Nowhere
in the Act is local government mentioned
and when ‘planning’ is mentioned, it is
done only casually and only in ﬁve
instances. Even in such instances, planning
means ‘a plan prepared by the National
Development Planning Commission’
(Section 61), not the activities of a local
government. Therefore, while the principles
of decentralisation suggest that STMA, as
the local government of Sekondi-Takoradi,
can use the windfalls from oil exploration to
improve the local economy, the analysis of
the empirical evidence shows less optimistic
scenarios.
Aside problems of ﬁnance, STMA faces
severe limitations in the performance of
its planning functions. Currently, there
are only six building inspectors (UN-
HABITAT, 2011) to serve a population of
over 500,000 people, only one development
planner, and only two town planners in the
planning department to serve the entire
metropolis (The Consortium, 2012). From
this perspective, the involvement of the oil
companies in the drafting of plans is wel-
come. However, by sponsoring the entire
plan-making process, it may be argued
that the city is likely to be shaped in the
interest of capital, not necessarily for the
public good as envisaged by the principles
of eminent domain and decentralisation.
Conclusion
This article shows that a political economic
analysis of oil should go beyond simple bin-
aries of ‘oil curse’ and ‘oil blessing’. An
approach that looks at lived experiences and
existing regulations within the framework
of eminent domain and decentralisation
shows that there are few winners, and
many losers, but they co-exist in the oil
city of Sekondi-Takoradi. Fisher and farm-
ing groups are likely to miss out as are the
majority low-income people who struggle
with housing. From a compensation per-
spective, the corporate oil entities and the
government beneﬁt – out of non-payment;
from a betterment angle, the landowning
class stands to gain. Local government can
make a diﬀerence, but current evidence sug-
gests that the local institutions only repro-
duce the ‘elite capture’ of the windfalls in
the oil city.
Small, medium, and large land owners
who live farther away from the explor-
ation drilling sites stand to make diﬀerent
levels of windfalls from increases in prop-
erty values. Given that this latter group is
not likely to pay any land taxes and
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betterment, they would make huge
‘unearned income’. Large land owners,
including chiefs who hold land ‘in trust’
of the people, are likely to beneﬁt on a
net basis too. Chiefs do not usually suﬀer
personally from a taking, but they gain
personally from selling land and receive
compensation payment in the instances
when it is paid. Big, private capital
including investors, and oil companies
stand to make the most proﬁt – this
class would make windfalls from specula-
tion which is even sweeter when the exist-
ing institutions in the city do not regulate
such economic behaviour.
The local government system tasked to
promote local economic development within
the principles of decentralisation tries to exe-
cute its roles, but with so many limitations
that its eﬀectiveness is curtailed. The support
it obtains from oil companies is welcome, but
it is unlikely to be without strings. Thus, for
now, the windfalls, wipeouts, and economic
development in Sekondi-Takoradi, are con-
centrated, not evenly spread.
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Notes
1. Interview with Airforce Police/Leading
Aircraft Man 30 January 2013.
2. Article 252 of the Constitution of Ghana says
that: ‘parliament shall annually make provision
for the allocation of not less than five percent of
the total revenues of Ghana to the District
Assemblies for development’ (Clause 2); and
‘The moneys accruing to the District
Assemblies in the Common Fund shall be dis-
tributed among all the district Assemblies on
the basis of a formula approved by
Parliament’ (Clause 3). Currently, the distribu-
tion is done according to the following formula:
need (poverty defined as health, education, and
water deprivation); responsiveness (how well
districts collect revenues); service pressure
(population density); equality (a minimum,
equal amount for all districts); poverty (schools
in need of major rehabilitation). In practice,
what is shared is 90%; with the remaining
10% going to members of parliament (5%);
Regional Co-Coordinating Council (2.5%);
Ministry of Local Government, and Rural
Development (2% to use for district assembly
purposes in a way that it deems fit); and DACF
Administrator (0.5% formonitoring and evalu-
ation) (Quainoo-Arthur, 2009: 56–57).
3. Fund set aside for use by ‘future’ generations.
References
Adu G (2009) On the theory of optimal depletion
of an exhaustible resource: The case of oil in
Ghana. African Review of Economics and
Finance 1(1): 40–50.
African Development Bank and African Union
(2009) Oil and Gas in Africa. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Akabzaa T and Darimani A (2001) Impact of
mining sector investment in Ghana: A study
of the Tarkwa mining region prepared for
SAPRI. Available at: http://www.saprin.org/
ghana/research/gha_mining.pdf (accessed 18
February 2013).
Alterman R (2011) Takings. In: Land resource
compensation symposium, UTS, Asia-Paciﬁc
Centre for Complex Real Property Rights,
Sydney, Australia, 11–12 July 2011.
Alterman R (2012) Land use regulations
and property values: The ‘windfalls capture’
idea revisited. In: Brooks N, Donaghy K and
Knaap G-J (eds) The Oxford Handbook of
Urban Economics and Planning. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 755–786.
Austin G (2005) Labour, Land and Capital in
Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in
440 Local Economy 28(4)
 at University of Technology Sydney on November 27, 2013lec.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Asante, 1807–1956. New York: University of
Rochester Press.
Bloch A and Owusu G (2012) Linkages in the
gold mining industry: Challenging the enclave
thesis. Resources Policy 37(4): 434–442.
Bob-Milliar G (2009) Chieftaincy, diaspora, and
development: The institution of Nksuohene in
Ghana. African Aﬀairs 108(433): 541–558.
Boydell S and Baya U (2011) Equitable compen-
sation models. In: Land resource compensa-
tion symposium, UTS, Asia-Paciﬁc Centre
for Complex Real Property Rights, Sydney,
Australia, 11–12 July 2011.
Boye C (2010) The oil ﬂows. Ghanaian Times, 16
December.
Breisinger C, Diao X, Schweickert R, et al.
(2010) Managing future oil revenues in
Ghana: An assessment of alternative alloca-
tion options. African Development Review
22(2): 303–315.
Brobbey K (1990) Customary tenure and locus
standi in compensation claims in Ghana.
Journal of Property Valuation and Investment
9(4): 313–322.
Bromley D (1997) Constitutional political
economy: Property claims in a dynamic
world. Contemporary Economic Policy 15(4):
43–54.
Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA) (2010)
Managing an Oil Economy. CEPA Selected
Economic Issues No. 21. Accra: CEPA.
The Consortium (2012) Interim Report: The
Preparation of Sekondi-Takoradi Structure
Plan. Accra: The Consortium.
Cooley A (2001) Booms and busts theorizing
institutional formation and change in oil
states. Review of International Political
Economy 8(1): 163–180.
Corden M and Neary P (1982) Booming
sector and de-industrialisation in a small
open economy. Economy Journal 92(368):
825–848.
Dagher J, Gottschalk J and Portillo R (2010) Oil
Windfalls in Ghana: A DSGE Approach. IMF
Working Paper WP/10/116. International
monetary Fund. Available at: http://www.im-
f.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10116.pdf
(accessed 18 February 2013).
Edem R (2011) The expected impact of the oil
discovery in Takoradi on land use patterns
and growth of the city. BSc Dissertation,
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and
Technology, Accra, Ghana.
Ekuful C (2010) Jubilee oil gushes out today.
Ghanaian Times, 15 December.
Enin K (2011) Security and crime management
in the wake of the discovery and exploration
of oil and gas in Ghana. In: Avoiding the oil
curse in Ghana, international conference,
Koforidua, Ghana, 24–27 November 2011.
Farvacque-Vitkovic C, Raghunath M, Eghoﬀ C
et al. (2008) Development of the Cities of
Ghana: Challenges, Priorities and Tools.
Africa Region Working Paper Series, No.110.
Frieden J (2000) Toward a political economy of
takings. Washington University Journal of
Law & Policy 3: 137–147. Available at:
http://digitalcommons.law.wustl.edu/wujlp/
vol3/iss1/6 (accessed 18 February 2013).
Gadugah N (2009) Takoradi: Tenants in danger




Gary I (2009) Ghana’s Big Test: Oil’s Challenge
to Democratic Development. Boston, MA:
Isodec Ghana and OXFAM America.
George H (2006) Progress and Poverty. Abridged
edn. (1st publ. 1879) New York: Robert
Schalkenbach Foundation.
Gyampo R (2011) Saving Ghana from its oil: A
critical assessment of preparations so far
made. Africa Today 57(4): 49–69.
Jeﬀries C (1975) Class, Power and Ideology in
Ghana. London: Cambridge University Press.
King R (2009) An institutional analysis of the
resource curse in Africa: Lessons for Ghana.
Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable
Development 2: 1–22.
Kleist N (2011) Modern chiefs: Tradition, devel-
opment and return among traditional autho-
rities in Ghana. African Aﬀairs. DOI:
10.1093/afraf/adr041.
Kwettey F (2010) Government will not collateral-
ise 100% of the oil revenue. Joy FM Newsﬁle
programme 4 December. Also reported by
Adogla D. Available at: http://news.my-
joyonline.com/news/201012/57040.asp
(accessed 24 January 2011).
Larbi W, Antwi A and Olomolaiye P (2004)
Compulsory land acquisition in Ghana: Policy
and praxis. Land Use Policy 21(2): 115–127.
Obeng-Odoom 441
 at University of Technology Sydney on November 27, 2013lec.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Lesourne J and Ramsay W (2009) Governance of
Oil in Africa: Unﬁnished Business. Paris:
IFRI.
McCaskie T (2008) The United States, Ghana
and oil: Global and local perspectives.
African Aﬀairs 107(428): 313–332.
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
(2010) 2011 Financial Year Budget of Ghana.
Accra: Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning.
Nuamah S (2013) Ghanaians abroad urged to
support nation’s development. Ghanaian
Times, 26 January.
Obeng-Odoom F (2009) Oil and urban develop-
ment in Ghana. African Review of Economics
and Finance 1(1): 18–39.
Obeng-Odoom F (2012a) Political economic ori-
gins of Sekondi-Takoradi, West Africa’s new
oil metropolis. Urbani Izziv 23(2): 121–130.
Obeng-Odoom F (2012b) Natural resource
abundance and eminent domain: A case
study from Africa. Local Economy 27(4):
319–325.
Obeng-Odoom F (2013 forthcoming) Black gold,
dirty waters, and food insecurity: A case
study from West Africa. Local Environment:
The International Journal of Justice and
Sustainability.
Obi C (2008) Enter the dragon? Chinese oil com-
panies and resistance in the Niger Delta.
Review of African Political Economy 35(117):
417–434.
Obi C (2009) Nigeria’s Niger Delta:
Understanding the complex drivers of violent
oil-related conﬂict. Africa Development 34(2):
103–128.
Obi C (2010) Oil extraction, dispossession, resist-
ance, and conﬂict in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger
Delta. Canadian Journal of Development
Studies 30(1/2): 219–236.
O’Faircheallaigh C (2008) Negotiating cultural
heritage? Aboriginal-mining company agree-
ments in Australia. Development and Change
39(1): 25–51.
O’Faircheallaigh C (2009) Eﬀectiveness in social
impact assessment: Aboriginal peoples and
resource development in Australia. Impact
Assessment and Project Appraisal 27(2):
95–110.
O’FaircheallaighC (2010) Public participation and
environmental impact assessment: Purposes,
implications, and lessons for public policy
making. Environmental Impact Assessment
Review 30: 19–27.
Ofosu-Mensah E (2011) Gold mining and the
socio-economic development of Obuasi in
Adanse. African Journal of History and
Culture 3(4): 54–64.
Owusu G and Afutu-Kotey R (2010) Poor urban
communities and municipal interface in
Ghana: A case study of Accra and Sekondi-
Takoradi metropolis. African Studies
Quarterly 12(1): 1–16.
Quainoo-Arthur R (2009) The District
Assemblies Common Fund: Record and chal-
lenges. In: ILO (ed.) Financing Local
Economic Development: Old Problems, New
Strategies. Geneva: ILO, pp. 54–60.
Re´my M (1997) Ghana Today, 4th edn. Paris:
Jaguar.
Rondinelli D (1980) Government decentralisa-
tion in comparative perspective: Theory and
practice in developing countries. International
Review of Administrative Sciences 47(2):
133–145.
Rosser A (2006) Escaping the resource curse.
New Political Economy 11(4): 557–570.
Saginor J and McDonald JR (2009) Eminent
domain: A review of the issues. Journal of
Real Estate Literature 17(1): 3–43.
Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly
(STMA) (2011) Sekondi-Takoradi





(STMA) (2012) Draft Structure Plan for
Sekondi-Takoradi. Sekondi: STMA.
Servant J (2003) Africa: External interest and
internal insecurity: The new Gulf Oil States.
Review of African Political Economy 30(95):
139–142.
Sittie R (2006) Land title registration:
The Ghanaian experience. In: XXIII FIG con-
gress, Munich, Germany, 8–13 October 2006.
Smoke P (2003) Decentralisation in Africa: Goals,
dimensions, myths and challenges. Public
Administration and Development 23(1): 7–16.
Stilwell F (2006) Political Economy: The Contest
of Economic Ideas, 2nd edn. Melbourne:
Oxford University Press.
442 Local Economy 28(4)
 at University of Technology Sydney on November 27, 2013lec.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Stilwell F and Jordan K (2004) The political
economy of land: Putting Henry George in
his place. Journal of Australian Political
Economy 54(December): 119–134.
Ubink J (2007) Traditional authority revisited:
Popular perceptions of chiefs and chieftaincy
in peri-urban Kumasi, Ghana. Journal of
Legal Pluralism 55: 123–161.
Ubink J (2008) Negotiated or negated? The rhet-
oric and reality of customary tenure in an
Ashanti village in Ghana. Africa 78(2):
264–287.
UN-HABITAT (2011) Ghana Housing Proﬁle.
Nairobi: UN-HABITAT.
Watt P (2004) Financing local government.
Local Government Studies 30(4): 609–623.
World Bank (2003) World Development Report
2004: Making Services Work for People.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
World Bank (2009) Economy-Wide Impact of Oil
Discovery in Ghana. World Bank Report No.
47321-G H. Available at: http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTGHANA/Resources/
Economy-Wide_Impact_of_Oil_Discovery_
in_Ghana.pdf (accessed 18 February 2013).
Yalley PP and Ofori-Darko J (2012) The eﬀects
of Ghana’s oil discovery on land and house
prices on communities nearest to the oil ﬁled
in Ghana (Case study: Kumasi and Sekondi-
Takoradi). In: 4th WABER conference,
Abuja, Nigeria, 24–26 July 2012.
Obeng-Odoom 443
 at University of Technology Sydney on November 27, 2013lec.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
